Sunday, May 24, 2020

Criminal Justice System Respond to Illicit Drugs - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 10 Words: 2858 Downloads: 3 Date added: 2017/09/23 Category Advertising Essay Type Argumentative essay Tags: Drugs Essay Did you like this example? Illicit drugs in Australia has been a concern for many years and targeted in many forms via politics and media. But what are the real harms and cost of illegal drug use in Australia? Does the drug issue relate to crime and increase drug related crime? Much research has been done on illegal drugs and how best to combat the problem. Should we be tough on drugs or take a step back with a more humane approach? The criminal justice system has approached this problem via many angles and is still working towards a system that works. It could be that the solution to the illicit drug problem could in fact be a mix of many strategies. This essay will examine the past and current trends in the criminal justice system and to analyse the strengths and the weaknesses involved. Research by the Australian Institute of Criminology (2004) has outlined the impact of illicit drugs on society. Many people assume there is a direct correlation between drugs and crime and this research undertaken in fact shows that drug use and crime have similar origins. Origins such as poor social support systems, difficultly in school, association with deviant peer groups and lack of access to economic support systems are the main similarities with drug users and criminals. The results of this research have opened our eyes to the direct link and the magnitude of the illicit drug problem. It is not possible to quantify the exact cost of illicit drug use to the Australian community. However, some components can be measured directly, such as government expenditure through the National Illicit Drug Strategy (NDIS), but many of the social costs borne by the community, such as the extra cost of welfare, health and law and order services, can only be estimated. In addition, a number of costs associated with illicit drug use are not quantifiable, such as pain and suffering resulting from a reduced quality of life. Nevertheless a number of studies attempt to quantify some of the costs of dr ug use, including social costs. Many also examine how these costs compare with the costs of licit drug use in the community (Burton, K 2004). Statistics from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare have discovered that Marijuana/cannabis accounted for 71% of illicit drug arrests in 2004–05. Further, in 2005, one in 10 prisoners was imprisoned for drug-related offences and finally in 2003–04, 88% of juvenile detainees had used an illicit substance 6 months prior to arrest and 70% were intoxicated at the time of offence. The Australian criminal justice system currently has two approaches to the illicit drug (for clarification, the definition of Illicit Drugs means a drug whose production, sale or possession is prohibited) problem. Prohibition and harm minimisation which will be discussed below. In short, the main aim of prohibition of drugs is to implement legislation and laws as a common means of attempting to control drug use. On the other hand we have har m minimisation which includes a range of targeted strategies designed to reduce drug-related harm for particular individuals and communities. It aims to reduce the harmful consequences of drugs when consumption cannot be further reduced. Drug laws have not stopped people using drugs, all it has done is create a multi-million dollar illegal market and fuel criminal acts to support such addictions. However, the economic costs associated with harmful drug use, including prevention, treatment, loss of productivity in the workplace, property crime, theft, accidents and law-enforcement activities, amount to over $18 billion annually (Collins Lapsley 1996). Which proves that the drug prohibition is not effective and another approach needs to be introduced. Prohibition is increasingly regarded as flawed in principle and a resounding failure in practice (Wodak Owens, 1996). When the drug laws in Australia were first introduced they came through prohibition instead of regulation. The argument was, that once something evil was banned, the problem was solved. This was not the case as banning such illegal drugs has only made the productions of same increase and created the role of drug traffickers and an illegal underworld to make and distribute such drugs through illegal avenues. As Wodak and Owens stated: â€Å"Focusing on drug use rather than drug-related harm is like concentrating on a mirage (p. 9)† In summary, prohibition has been somewhat successful in raising the health, social and economic costs of drug use. However, each year with technological change, geopolitical developments and the new trade environment make the job of prohibition even harder. On 2 April 1985 Australia officially adopted another view on illegal drugs and this approach was known as harm minimisation. This approach involves supply reduction, demand reduction and harm reduction. Harm minimisation has approached the drug use problem by introducing such schemes as information to drug users about how to safely use drugs and supervised injection rooms for users. Extensive consultation and collaboration between these services and police have been important in their success in reducing the spread of blood borne viruses in the community. Governments do not condone illegal risk behaviours such as injecting drug use: they acknowledge that these behaviours occur and that they have a responsibility to develop and implement public health and law-enforcement measures designed to reduce the harm that such behaviours can cause (Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy 1998:46). Harm minimisation encourages change in our attitudes towards people who use drugs including those who are physically and psychologically dependant on illegal drugs. However, whether this is an effective approach is a common argument. One advantage is the fact that Australia does have the lowest reported rate of HIV infection in the world which is evidence alone that harm minimisation approach c an work in the community. Harm minimisation can best be viewed in context of community safety and this is an approach to drug use to help keep people safe when they choose to use drugs. One important policy intervention that has gained increased prominence in recent years is the diversion of drug and drug related (crimes committed while under the influence of drugs) offenders. Aimed at deterring, educating or treating the causes of drug dependence, diversion involves the use of the criminal justice system to provide alternative responses, including referral to drug treatment. The main aim of prohibition of drugs is to implement legislation and laws as a common means of attempting to control drug use. On the other hand harm minimisation recognizes the need to seek a balance between supply reduction (disrupt both the supply of illicit drugs entering Australia and the production and distribution of illicit drugs within Australia), demand reduction (reduce the desire for and prepa redness to obtain and use drugs) and harm reduction strategies (reduce the impacts of drug-related harm on individuals and communities). Recently harm minimisation took on another strategy known as a diversionary scheme. In April 2009 the Council of Australian Government (COAG) endorsed the National Illicit Drugs Strategy (NDIS) package, providing over $111,536,000 to create a ‘tough on drugs’ initiative that gives priority to diverting illicit drug offenders into treatment. Guidelines were created for States and Territories to divert minor illicit drug offenders into assessment, education and treatment at many levels of the criminal justice system. The aim was to reduce the amount f offenders that appear before the court for possession of illicit drugs , provide incentives for minor offenders to address their drug use and increase access to drug education and treatment. This strategy is based on a harm minimisation approach which refers to policies and programs aime d at reducing drug-related harm and protecting the community and users. Dr Woolridge (past Federal Health Minister)1999 has stated that it is clinically proven that if you can reach a drug user before the addiction becomes full-blown that you have a better chance of stopping the drug use. Taking this approach statistics have shown that as of July 2007, there were 51 programs that divert drug and drug related offenders: * 69% of programs have been introduced since 2000. * 59% were funded by the Coalition of Australian Governments’ Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative. * 31% involved police diversion, 22% court diversion, 18% drug court diversion and 29% were mixed. * 33% of programs targeted drug use/possession offence(s), 12% drug related offence(s) and 55% any offence(s). 45% of programs targeted adults, 27. 5% youth and 27. 5% mixed. * 49% resulted in assessment and compulsory treatment, 17% assessment and voluntary treatment, 9% cautions and referrals to education sessions , 20% warning/formal caution/family group conference, and 8% a fine or optional attendance at an education session (Hughes Ritter 2008) To date each state and territory has created and implemented their own diversionary and harm minimisation measures to tackle the illicit drug problems. Each state and territory have varying programs which may be somewhat different to each of the other states. Some programs may be easier to access, others may only cater for a specific group (ie indigenous people or juveniles). However, they all have the same major programs available as outlined below. According to the Australian Institute of Criminology there are 5 types of drug-diversionary programs currently in use across Australia. Within each of these areas of criminal justice there are a number of diversionary programs available. These initiatives can be divided into groups, depending on their position along the criminal justice continuum. Starting with the pre-arrest phase the most impor tant diversionary measures is police discretion where officers can detect the offence but not lay charges and provide further information to the offender about how to manage and drug problems and refer them in the right direction. Other measures in place are infringement notices, informal warnings, formal caution and caution plus intervention (where counseling/information sessions must be attended). Police drug diversion –at the front end are the various police based drug diversion programs offer drug education and assessment for those individuals with minor possession offences relating to cannabis or other illicit substances. Next step on the criminal justice continuum is the Pre-trial stage where a charge is made but before the matter is heard at court. Here we have options like treatment as a bail condition, conferencing or prosecutor discretion (where treatment is offered as an alternative to proceeding with prosecution). These programs are at court level and are pr imarily bail-based programs to provide assessment and short term treatment options for less serious offenders who criminal behaviour is related to their illicit drug use. The next stage is Pre-sentence which is after conviction but before sentencing, this stage includes such measures as delay of sentence where offender may be assessed or treated. Post-conviction/sentence includes the process of sentencing. Diversionary measures can include suspended sentences requiring complying with conditions such as treatment, avoidance of drugs and specific peer groups. At this stage offenders can also be referred to the Drug Courts which are judicially supervised and enforced treatment programs which offer long-term initiative treatment for offenders who drug dependency is a key contributor to their offending. The final stage where diversionary measures can be utlised is in the Pre-release stage which is prior to the release from goal on parole. Options here include transfers to drug treatme nt programs or early release to attend a supervised treatment program. Even though the diversionary programs vary between jurisdictions, for example, in some states police can only caution first time offenders or juveniles and in other jurisdictions diversion is available for any offender caught with drugs, irrespective of age or criminal history. According to the National Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative (IDDI) the findings were generally very positive. Across all jurisdictions , the majority of people who were referred into the IDDI program did not reoffend in the 12 to 18 month period after their diversion. In most cases, those that did reoffend did so only once during this time. Payne et al, 2008). The cost of the various police diversion programs is significant. However, if these initiatives are achieving such their objectives, such costs should be more than offset by the benefits of accruing to the community through a reduction of illicit drug use and related offending and reduced case loads for the criminal justice system. There has been only one study (Baker Goh 2004) that has examined the cost-effectiveness of diversion. The results demonstrated positive results in savings to the criminal justice system. In the first three years of operation it was estimated that over 18,000 police hours were saved as a result of not having to charge offenders at the time of detection, prepare matters for court and attend subsequent hearings. Baker and Goh also calculated that the scheme resulted in total savings of well over $1million dollars during the first 3 years of operation. In the years following the development of the IDDI, researchers (most notably the Alcohol and Other Drugs Council of Australia, ADCA), outlined the benefits of and challenges to expanding the drug diversion and harm minimisation approach. Over coming the political perception that drug diversion was a ‘soft’ option (Hughes, C 2007). While the â€Å"Tough on Drugs Div ersion Initiative’ was seen by policy makers as heralding a more humane response and more harm minimisation approach, the expression and framing of the program was that this was not the case. As John Howard said: â€Å"in no way does it [drug diversion] retreat from our ‘Tough on Drugs’ philosophy, our zero tolerance approach†. So the point that the Government are portraying is that illicit drug use is still against the law however, if someone has psychological, health and social problems, you don’t belong in jail. If the problem is drug use, than that problem must be tackled in order to decrease the social impacts of illicit drug use and to prevent a new generation of drug-users committing drug related crime (Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing, 2004). One of the positive outcomes of the harm minimisation/drug diversion initiatives is that is has now encouraged the collaboration of health and law enforcement services. Which were once two very separate divisions have combined forces to tackle the issue of illicit drug use and have broken down the barriers that once segregated the divisions as traditionally the health and justice systems have had little to do with each other with no referral pathway between them. Diversion programs are gradually changing this (Tresidder, J 2003). In conclusion after observing that the prohibition of drugs has not made any significant impact on the use of illicit drugs in society the harm minimisation approach was initiated. This approach was further developed and the drug diversion scheme was created to target the problem in return for long term solutions to protect the drug users and community from each other. Research has shown that this has been successful to some degree however it has come across as somewhat contradictory to the â€Å"tough on drugs† campaign that is portrayed in the media. There is many mixed messages being sent and portrayed about the approach to illicit drugs in the criminal justice system. To date the drug diversionary programs has been the only approach to illicit drugs that has made any headway and molded around the existing drug problems. It is a policy that is designed to reflect the variety of problems that drugs can cause and by treating the cause is the only way to tackle the problem. References Australian Institute of Criminology, Does drug use cause crime? Understanding the drugs-crime link. www. aic. gov. au/publications. crm accessed 10 January 2010. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2007. Statistics on drug use in Australia 2006. Drug Statistics Series No. 18. Cat. no. PHE 80. Canberra: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. Baker, J. and Goh, D. (2004). The Cannabis Cautioning Scheme three years on: An implementation and outcome evaluation. Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Burton, K, 2004. Illicit Drugs in Australia: Use, Harm and Policy Responses, Parliamentary Library, https://www. aph. gov. au/library/intguide/sp/illicitdrugs. htm, accessed 13 January 2009. Collins DJ Lapsley HM. 1996. The Social Costs of Drug Abuse in Australia in 1988 and 1992, National Drug Strategy monograph series no. 30, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing. Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative – about diversion. www. health. gov. au Hughes, C. Away from the Courts, Of Substance: The national magazine on Alcohol, Tobacco and other drugs. Volume 7 number 2, 2009 pages 21 and 21. Hughes, C. 2007. Evidence Based policy or policy based evidence? The role of evidence in the development and implementation of the Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative, Drug and Alcohol Review( July 2007)Pages 363-368. Hughes, C. and Ritter, A. 2008. Monograph No. 16: A summary of diversion programs for drug and drug-related offenders in Australia. DPMP Monograph Series. Sydney: National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre. Payne, J. K wiathkowski, M. Wundersitz, J. 2008. Police Drug Diversion: a study of criminal offending outcomes. AIC Report, Australian Institute of Criminology. Middendorp, C, 2010, Drug Prohibition Doesn’t Work, so What do we do Next? TheAge. com, https://www. theage. com. au/opinion/society-and-culture/drug-prohibition-doesnt-workso-what-do-we-do-next-20100106-lu8v. html, accessed 13 January 2010. National Drug Strategic Framework: 1998–99 to 2002–03, Building Partnerships: A strategy to reduce the harm caused by drugs in our community. Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy 1998 Tresidder, J. 2003. Police Drug Diversion. Of Substance: The national magazine on Alcohol, Tobacco and other drugs. Volume 1 number 1, pages 25-27. Woodak, A and Owens, R. 1996. Drug Prohibition, A Call for Change, University of NSW, Sydney, Australia. Wooldrige, Dr M, 1999, Tough on Drugs diversion programme an enlightened approach. https://www. health. gov. au/internet/main/publishing. nsf/Con tent/health-mediarel-yr1999-mw-mw99112a. htm accessed 13 January 2010. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Criminal Justice System Respond to Illicit Drugs" essay for you Create order

Wednesday, May 13, 2020

The Pen Name Of Samuel Langhorne Clemens - 933 Words

Mark Twain was the pen name of Samuel Langhorne Clemens, one of the most famous writers of American Literature. He was born on November 30, 1835, in the tiny Midwestern village of Florida, Missouri. He was the sixth child of John and Jane Clemens. As a four year old, his family moved to Hannibal and he began to become exposed to the social and financial problems of his era when. Hannibal was a small town near the Mississippi River where his father his uncle owned slaves. Twain created his own opinions about African-American culture while interacting with them himself. As a matter of fact, young Twain spent many summers on his uncle’s farm, listening to the tales and spirituals told and sung in the slave quarters, establishing his appreciation for African-American rights and culture. (Huso). John Clemens worked as anything he could to feed his family; however, the disillusion of never obtaining wealth he dreamed of, made him a bitter man. Based on a legend, young Twain never s aw him smile. On the other hand, his mother was a fun-loving, tenderhearted homemaker who whiled away numerous winter s nights for her family by telling stories. She became household’s head in 1847 when John passed away unexpectedly. (â€Å"About Mark Twain.). After his father’s death, Twain’s life was never the same. He was only able to attend formal education until the fifth grade. Then Twain found a job as a printer’s apprentice, where he arranged type for his community’s newspaper stories. ThisShow MoreRelatedEssay about Mark Twain1654 Words   |  7 Pagesborn with the name Samuel Langhorne Clemens in Florida, Missouri, to John Marshall Clemens and Jane Lampton Clemens on November 30, 1835. While Samuel Clemens was very young the Clemens family moved to Hannibal, Missouri, the inspiration for most of Samuel Clemens novels. John Marshall Clemens worked as a lawyer, but he was very successful, so he also did some work as a land speculator. The Clemens family was never very wealthy but they were middle class. John Marshall Clemens was agonisticRead MoreAgainst The Assault Of Laughter Nothing Can Stand827 Words   |  4 PagesAgainst the assault of laughter nothing can stand. - Samuel Clemens Samuel Langhorne Clemens, also known as Mark Twain, was born November 30, 1835, in Florida, Missouri, the sixth of seven children. An American writer, journalist, and humorist, he is remembered for the novels surrounding the world beside the Mississippi River, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876) and always legendary Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884). Clemens was lauded the greatest American humorist of his ageRead MoreA Brief Biography of Mark Twain668 Words   |  3 PagesMark Twain was born on November. 30, 1835 in the small town of Florida, MO. Mark’s birth name was Samuel Langhorne Clemens. In 1839, the Clemens family moved 35 miles east to the town of Hannibal, in Mississippi. Mark kept to himself and in doors in his early years because of poor health and sickness. That was the case until he became years of age. He recovered from his illness and started playing outside with the rest of the children. Growing up his Father was a judge and worked a lot. He alsoRead MoreEssay on The Importance of Mark Twain in American Literature840 Words   |  4 Pagesthe Mississippi, Huckleberry Finn, and The Adventures of Tom Sawyer. In these books, Mark Twain recalls his own adventures of steamboating on the Mississippi River. Samuel Langhorne Clemens was born on November 30, 1835 in a small village of Florida, Missouri. His parents names were John Marshall Clemens and Jan Lampton Clemens, descendants of slaves in Virginia. They had been married in Kentucky and move to Tennessee and then Missouri. When Sam was four, his father, who was full of the grandioseRead MoreThe Secret Of Getting Ahead Is Getting Started1713 Words   |  7 Pagesstories on a boy by the name of Tom Sawyer, Huckleberry Finn and the mighty Mississippi River, Mark Twain ventured the American soul with intelligence, optimism, and a keen eye for the truth. He became nothing less than a national treasure (AE Television). Early Life Samuel Langhorne Clemens was born on November 30, 1835, in a minute village of Florida, Missouri, he was the sixth child of Jane and John Clemens. At age 4, the Clemens family moved to near town by the name of Hannibal, which was aRead MoreWho Is Mark Twain? Essay1479 Words   |  6 PagesAmerican Literature. His name was Mark Twain and he was Americas most famous literary icon, publishing 28 pieces. He was born on Nov. 30, 1835 as Samuel L. Clemens in the little town of Florida, Mo. He was the sixth child of John Marshall and Jane Lampton Clemens (Quirk). As a young child Clemens had poor health and stayed inside most of the time, causing all sorts of mischief. Spending most of his time with his mother he caught her sense of humor. Later in his life Clemens asked his mother aboutRead MoreEssay on A Brief Biography of Mark Twain1322 Words   |  6 PagesSamuel Langhorne Clemens was born on November 30, 1835. Clemons grew up in a town called Hannibal, Missouri. Here Sam Clemens saw an array of different type of people pass through his town. People such as: gamblers, entertainers, thieves, and even slave traders that influenced his childhood memories. We see traces of his rugged hometown deeply embedded with southern tradition. Clemens was known as a mischievous boy that smoked, led of crew of pranksters, and often played hooky from school. AtRead More Mark Twain Essay2338 Words   |  10 Pages Samuel Langhorne Clemens, better known as Mark Twain, is perhaps the most distinguished author of American Literature. Next to William Shakespeare, Clemens is arguably the most prominent writer the world has ever seen. In 1818, Jane Lampton found interest in a serious young lawyer named John Clemens. With the Lampton family in heavy debt and Jane only 15 years of age, she soon arried John. The family moved to Gainesboro, Tennessee where Jane gave birth to Orion Clemens. In the summer of 1827 theRead MoreMark Twain3000 Words   |  12 Pageswriters. Expository Research. The American literature has seen a lot of great writers but there is one, who will always be associated with America. And that person is Mark Twain, who lived during 1835 and 1910. Mark Twain, pseudonym of Samuel Longhorne Clemens, is famous not only in his home country – America but also in many other foreign countries. He became very well-known thanks to his wonderful creations, such as The Innocents Abroad (1869), Roughing It (1872) and Life on the MississippiRead MoreThe Pros And Cons Of Anonymity Online958 Words   |  4 Pagesin their pockets, our smart phones. Have you ever been online on; Facebook, YouTube, a blog, etc., and looked at the comments? While there can be multiple heartfelt comments, there can also be negative comments. â€Å"You look like an ugly slob†-from no name. This type of comments is a growing problem in today media world. I hope to increase awareness in media users of the pros and cons of using anonymity online. While elaborating with an opinion editorial I will demonstrate the negative aspect of anonymity

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

Forming habits to prevent obesity Free Essays

Forming habits to prevent obesity â€Å"Obesity has reached epidemic proportions globally, with at least 2. 8 million people dying each year as a result of being overweight or obese† (10 Facts). They have tried to classify obesity as disease for a long time. We will write a custom essay sample on Forming habits to prevent obesity or any similar topic only for you Order Now The American Medical Association recently declared and classified obesity as a disease. Obesity puts you at a high risk for many diseases. Bad habits are the main cause of obesity. You have to improve your nutritional and physical habits to prevent obesity. You are more likely to live a healthy adulthood if you eat right and stay in shape. Obesity is an issue that our society faces. Developing healthy habits as children, teenagers, or even in our early adulthood could help us prevent obesity. Not being involved in physical activities and not eating right causes obesity. The conclusion from a research made by The World Health Organization was â€Å"The prevalence rates of overweight and obesity in Canadian youth are high. The results suggest that physical inactivity and sedentary behaviors are strongly related to obesity in Canadian adolescents† Oanssen). If we don’t take care of our bodies this could be harmful, as we get older. Depression is a mental disorder that could be lethal, â€Å"More han 90 percent of people who commit suicide have a diagnosable mental disorder – most commonly a depressive disorder or a substance abuse disorder. † (Depression). The statistics of suicides caused by obesity are alarming; this makes obesity a major issue that we need to take care of. Depressed people tend to eat more too making it hard for them to stay healthy. Depression can also make you feel isolated by society. These kinds of thoughts are very common among obese teenagers. Being active can help with depression and also fghts obesity, this is why developing active habits is important. Parents play big role in helping their children to develop these habits. A healthy environment at home where the kids are able to get the right nutrition and where they can practice physical activities constantly helps to prevent obesity. A study conducted by the Centre for Community Child Health (CCCH) at the Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne, and the Murdoch Children’s Research Institute, concluded that † A large cross section of Australian preschoolers has, for the first time, suggested that fathers could be at the frontline in preventing early childhood obesity. Mothers are ften blamed for their children’s obesity, but this study suggests that for more effective prevention, perhaps we should focus on the whole family. (Preidt) It makes a significant difference if the parents take care of their child’s nutrition. Most of the time we can find food ads on television or the Internet and we see different kinds of unhealthy foods such as McDonalds, Burger King, and Dominos Pizza. These ads make us want to eat these kinds of foods. Kids like fast food and if their parents prevent them from eating a lot of fast food this will help them develop a habit of eating in a healthier way. Parents are responsible for feeding their children correctly. Research conducted by the Institute for Global Health and The Sydney University concluded that. â€Å"An environment that bombards us trom dawn until d with recommendations to eat and drink unhealthy foods is what makes us obese†. (Neal) Parents should embrace physical activities for their children. Television viewing time appears to be an important indicator of a range of lifestyle behaviors likely to promote obesity over time. A study that was conducted on whether television affects obesity or not concluded this; â€Å"The results of this randomized, controlled trial provide vidence that television viewing is a cause of increased body fatness and that reducing television viewing is a promising strategy for preventing obesity’ (Robinson). Based on this information we could say that television is a bad habit, because decreasing television in your routine is beneficial for you and it helps you prevent obesity. A high level of physical activity helps you to lose calories and if you do so regularly you can prevent obesity. Some people argue that parents are really not important to obesity. They think that even if the parents embrace a healthy lifestyle, that in some cases obesity is a enetic problem and you cannot prevent it. Genetics play a big role in obesity but even the people that are genetically most likely to become obese, when they have the right habits, do not become obese. The easiest way to form and change these habits is when we are children and that is why our parents are so influential. The physical habits that we create help us fght obesity and stay in shape; people normally develop these habits when are kids or when they are teenagers. Katherine Tallmadge talks in her book â€Å"Diet Simple: 195 Mental Tricks, Substitutions, Habits Inspirations Simple† about how small changes have been responsible for amazing mprovement in the health of children. Just adding fruits or vegetables at each meal or 1 5 extra minutes of daily exercise helps to avoid obesity. (Tallmadge) Schools have implemented some nutritional programs that have successfully formed healthy habits in their participants; this helps to prevent obesity. Schools give healthy choices during lunch and breaks so kids have the chance to eat healthy and stay in shape. The National Association for Sport and Physical Education recommends 1 50 minutes a week of PE for elementary school children and 225 minutes a week for middle and secondary-school children† (Story). These programs have been successful in the schools that have implemented them. Extracurricular activities such as sports are also very effective in helping to develop these habits that we need to stay fit. Interscholastic sports programs, intramural activities, and physical activity clubs also keep children active in school. Intramural sports and clubs offer students with a wide range of opportunities to engage in physical activity. It is proven that children who engage in these activities are more likely to be active adults and stay in shape. The U. S. Department of Health and Human Services recommends hat children and adolescents should engage in at least 60 minutes of physical activity daily. A 2009 survey found that only 18 percent of high school students adhered to this recommendation, while only 33 percent attended physical education class each day. (2008 Physical) For adults it is harder to create new habits and change old ones. I strongly recommend that adults seek professional help. There are nutritionists and professional trainers who can help you improve your lifestyle, helping you tight obesity They know the way that the body works so they can advise you in what to do. Besides fghting obesity they can also help you by encouraging you to get in the shape that you desire. After this process you will have this knowledge that you can continue to implement in your lifestyle. Some people argue that they don’t exercise or that they know people who do not exercise and are still not obese. People that have a fast metabolism find it really hard to gain weight but even if they are not obese they are still unhealthy if they do not exercise and if they eat poorly. Looking back we see some clear points about how we need and how could prevent obesity. We need to prevent obesity because it could cause some other high-risk isease and eventually death. By having a good plan of nutrition and a good exercise plan we are going to develop good habits that are going to help us prevent obesity; is even better if we develop them when we are very young. How to cite Forming habits to prevent obesity, Papers

Sunday, May 3, 2020

Einzatsgruppen. Mobile Killing Squads free essay sample

These squads were under the command of the German Security Police and Security Service Officers. They were ordered to kill any Jewish people within the Soviet territory, it matter if it was a 90 year old man or even a 5 year old boy those perceived to be racial or political enemies found behind German lines in the Soviet Union. The victims were of different racial views including Jews, Gypsies (Roma) and officials of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State.  disabled They also murdered thousands of residents of institutions for the mentally and physically. Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing squads) and Ordnungspolizei (order police) were the first step of the â€Å"Final Solution† which was to clear all Jews from Europe by going around and killing them as Hitler had said. Germany invaded the Soviet Union on the day of June 22, 1941. The Germans then decided to stop imprisoning the Jews and then took place in many mass killing all over Europe. We will write a custom essay sample on Einzatsgruppen. Mobile Killing Squads or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page The Mobile Killing Squads were very quick at what they did. By the time the Jews found out that they were there the squads would have already rounded them all up. Containing Jewish Men, Woman and children, they would also take any Communist party leaders or Gypsies. The Einsatzgruppen murdered more than 1 million people, almost all civilians. The Einsatzgruppen operated throughout the territory occupied by the German armed forces following the German invasions on Poland in September in 1939 of the Soviet Union in June 1941. They had operations ranging from the murder of a few people to operations that would last two or more days e.  g. Babi Yar (33,771 killed in two days) and Rumbula (25,000 killed in two days). Raul Hilberg estimates that between 1941 and 1945 the Einsatzgruppen and the SS killed more than 1. 3 million Jews, Gypsies and Soviet political commissars. In some cases the Einsatzgruppen would demand that the Jews were to dig big holes, the Jews would then later be executed and the big holes would be their graves. There was rough ly 200 executions were occurring daily. In the first couple of weeks of the Polish campaign the Einsatzgruppen carried out more than 10,000 arrests. On the 3 September 1939 Heinrich Himmler ordered them to shoot all insurgents, mass shooting were carried out by the Einsatzgruppen, police and troops. By September 10 340 – 540 Polish civilians had been shot in the town. The  Einsatzgruppen  were special SS mobile formations tasked with carrying out the mass murder of Jews, communist functionaries, and others deemed unfit to live by the Nazis. Sometimes, the killing squads did not even have to do the dirty work. Before they arrived, local residents had already taken the law into their own hands and decided to kill all the local Jews that they could find.

Friday, March 27, 2020

Termination for Convenience Clauses in Building Construction and Infrastructure Contracts free essay sample

1. Infrastructure, building and construction contracts often contain so called â€Å"termination for convenience† provisions, operating independently of breach, default or frustration. Termination of a contract has been considered as the legal consequence of certain kinds of breach, repudiation or frustration. Frustration is automatic. Breach and repudiation arise where default has occurred. 2. Provisions for termination at the convenience of, or at the will of the contracting parties, or any one or more of them, have become known as â€Å"termination for convenience provisions† (referred to in this paper as â€Å"TFC†) or â€Å"termination at will† provisions. . TFC can be invoked in circumstances agreed by the contracting parties (for example, at the will of all or any of the parties; in the absolute discretion of all or any of the parties; or on the occurrence of a specified event or specified events at the behest of all or any of the parties and on not ice), as can their contractual consequences (for example, payment or compensation, with or without formulae for its calculation, or no compensation at all). We will write a custom essay sample on Termination for Convenience Clauses in Building Construction and Infrastructure Contracts or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page . TFC in a contract would, on one view, appear antipathetic to the formation of contractual relations. TFC have given rise to debate and will continue to do so in respect of their application, construction and consequence. If a contract is defined as no more than a legally binding promise or agreement, TFC arguably occupies the whole area of possible obligation, leaving no room for the existence of a contract at all. Further, if the essence of contract, regarded as a class of obligations, is a voluntary assumption of a legally enforceable duty, where there are identifiable parties, certain terms and consideration (unless by deed), TFC may be seen to attack the fundamental elements of a binding contract. Questions of validity for want of mutuality may arise at one end of the spectrum of possible consequences of TFC in contracts (but an argument that TFC means no contract exists because of an absence of mutuality would likely not succeed). At the other end of the spectrum is the proposition that the provisions mean what they say by reference to the precise words used no more and no less. In between are questions of whether, for example, terms should be implied into a contract either by law, because of the type of contract being considered, or ad hoc, to give the contract legal efficacy; whether TFC can be breached by reason of an absence of good faith implied into the contract; or whether, if a term of good faith is implied, that implied term an itself be breached. 5. TFC in contracts appear harsh. More importantly, their terms would suggest that a contract can be ended at any time, even if there has been significant performance, in the absence of breach or default by the party against whom the provisions are invoked. If the provisions do not provide for compensation on termination, the rights of the parties pre-termination and post-termination are left to the application of principle. 6. TFC have given rise to some, b ut surprisingly, perhaps, little discussion. The purposes of this paper (with particular, but not exclusive, reference to infrastructure, building and construction contracts) are to consider some issues in respect of TFC, including whether: i)the provisions in contracts give an unfettered right to terminate where the plain terms of the would permit it; ii) terms, for example, of good faith, are implied into contracts containing TFC and, if so, their application to such provisions; iii)any requirement for compensation follows on the provisions being invoked where the provisions fail to so provide. With emphasis on: a. first, the history and development of TFC. some history of the development of TFC gives indications of the consequences of TFC in government and non-government contracts; b. second, TFC in the broad context of principles of construction and interpretation of contracts; c. third, TFC in the broad context of principles for the implication of terms in contracts; d. fourth, the affect of an implied term to act in good faith in terminating a contract pursuant to TFC; e. fifth, the provision in TFC for compensation and remedies in or arising from the TFC including remedies in the event of absence of compensation provisions in TFC. . Sixth, conclusions. Some History of Termination For Convenience Provisions in Contracts 7. The genesis of TFC, at least in the United Kingdom and in Australia, lay in a so called â€Å"Doctrine of Executive Necessity†. The Crown, and Statutory Corporations may contract. The power of the latter is derived from statute. Valid contracts, may, however be overridden when a conflict between a contract and the public duties of the authority becomes apparent. The power to override contractual obligations rather than capacity to contract is enerally the issue. The Crown or a public authority cannot by contract be disabled from exercising their governmental powers, whether they be legislative or executive. The doctrine may have narrow application, but it exists nevertheles s. 8. An application of the doctrine is in The Amphitrite, where governmental notification of the withdrawal of loading facilities and clearance for a load of coal, contrary to a prior undertaking, acted upon by the ship owners, resulted in an action in damages for breach of contract. Rowlatt J. eld, that the contract was not one that damages could be sued for because â€Å"†¦it is not competent for the Government to fetter its future executive action, which must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community when the question arises†. 9. The decision in The Amphitrite was controversial, but the existence of the doctrine was not. Thus, citing The Amphitrite, Mason J. said: â€Å"in the absence of specific words, an undertaking which would affect the exercise of discretionary powers to be exercised for the public good, should not be imputed to the Commonwealth†. 0. Although the existence of the principle was not doubted, the reasoning of Rowlatt J. seemed to be that no contract existed at all because of the doctrine. The reasoning suggested an absence of capacity to contract. If so, The Amphitrite was wrongly decided . The circumstances in which the doctrine applied and consequences of its application have not proceeded on the basis of an absence of capacity in the Crown and its instrumentalities to contract. Rather, issues of damages for breach or compensation were pursued. 11. There is no doubt about the existence of the Doctrine in Australia and the United Kingdom. Its application was implicit and overriding, albeit within a narrow compass. A contract validly entered, could not bind a government or statutory corporation from exercising its statutory powers, absent some statutory prohibition, to the prejudice of the other party. Strictly, properly invoking the doctrine was not a breach of contract. Neither was it a frustrating event. It did not sound in damages contrary to the argument of Hogg. Invoking the doctrine to terminate a contract may be the subject of administrative review Contractual provisions requiring compensation when the Doctrine was invoked was as much common sense as the facilitation of business with government and its instrumentalities. 12. It seemed but a short step to provide for the exigencies of executive necessity in government contracts by incorporating â€Å"termination for convenience† provisions in written contracts. There were, however, at least three consequences. First, the doctrine of executive necessity continued independently of contractual terms and continues to apply to government contracts. There is no suggestion that the doctrine was replaced by â€Å"termination for convenience† clauses, but its application is narrow. Second, in respect of contracts entered into by the Crown or its instrumentalities, the difference between political acts (which were subject to judicial review) and contractual acts (which were not subject to judicial review) opened further debate. Third, because they were contractual (having jumped the hurdle identified in 4 above), the provisions were subject to legal and equitable principles in respect of formation, construction and enforcement, including the implication of terms, as later discussion will demonstrate. The implication of terms requiring good faith vis-a-vis the contracting party against whose interests the provision was invoked (contrast the Doctrine of Executive Necessity where the exercise of good faith served only the purposes of the party invoking it) will be considered in this paper. Further, the application of contractual principles saw some contracts provide for separate consideration for and in respect of TFC . 13. Finn J. , in 2003, observed that TFC had received little attention in Australian legal writing. One might go further and suggest that even though TFC are now common in government and non-government contracts in Australia, they have received little attention either in decided cases or in relevant literature. It is intended in this paper to consider some of the more significant material. 4. In the United States TFC seems to have developed originally in government war contracts as â€Å"a tool to avoid enormous procurements upon completion of a war effort†, although its province is no longer so limited. The principle evolved into government contracts of far ranging varieties, both civilian and military where the exigencies of war no longer limited the government’s ability to terminate a contract for convenience. 15. TFC developed even fur ther in the United States with â€Å"constructive termination for convenience†. Where a contract was terminated for an ineffectual reason or the contract was rescinded or repudiated on an invalid basis, TFC were validly invoked to justify the government’s actions ex post facto. The principle was not dissimilar to the principle in Australian jurisprudence of reliance on the termination of a contract for valid reasons unknown at the time of termination for ineffectual reasons. TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE PROVISIONS IN THE BROAD CONTEXT OF PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS. 16. There is no reason to suggest that building construction and infrastructure contracts should not be subject to orthodox principles of construction of commercial contracts. The principles are important when considering, later, the implication of terms and the exception to the â€Å"parol evidence† rule applicable to a consideration of whether terms are implied. 17. Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Investors Compensation Scheme Limited v West Bromwich B. S. (H. L. (E. )), gives five principles by which contractual documents are construed. It has been cited with approval in the High Court, except insofar as it may be discerned that Investors took a broader view of the admissible â€Å"backround† than was taken by the High Court in Codelfa in which case Codelfa should be followed. 18. Courts adopt a sensible approach to construction. There is a presumption, for example, that terms would not operate unreasonably. 19. The sensible approach to construction of a commercial contract does not permit the rejection of an interpretation, though unreasonable, if it was clearly intended by the parties. 0. A Court, given the task of construing a commercial contract, will be concerned to give effect to the intention of the parties, ascertained from the instrument as a whole. A commercial contract requires attention to the language used by the parties, the commercial circumstances which the document addresses and the objects which it is intended to secure. 21. Further, it is not the case that words used in a commercial contrac t are necessarily to be given their dictionary meaning, if, for example, it would frustrate its sensible operation. 22. A provision, which is ambiguous may be construed contra proferentem against the party benefiting from the provision but the rule is one of last resort. It is preferable for judges to struggle with the words used in the contract. 23. It follows that TFC cannot be construed in isolation of the contract of which it forms part. The contract must be construed as a whole. 24. Further, it is very well to identify the â€Å"rules† for the construction of a contract, but the question remains as to what evidence is admissible for that purpose. 25. The written contract, complete or incomplete, was traditionally to be nterpreted without the use of extrinsic evidence. The broad purpose of the rule called the â€Å"parol evidence rule† was to exclude extrinsic evidence (except as to surrounding circumstances), including direct statements of intention (except in cases of latent ambiguity) and antecedent negotiations, to subtract from, add to, vary or contradict the language of a writt en instrument. 26. The true rule has been refined to be that evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning. Generally speaking facts existing when the contract was made, unless known to both parties, or are notorious and therefore presumed, are not admissible. Objective, backround facts may be elicited by evidence of prior negotiations but not otherwise. 27. Where more than one meaning of a contract is possible, evidence of the objective framework of facts within which the contract came into existence, and to the parties’ presumed intention in that setting, is admissible. 28. Evidence of mutual intention, if it amounts to concurrence, is admissible to negative an inference sought to be drawn from surrounding circumstances. 29. Evidence of the parties’ presumed intention in the construction of a contract has led (logically) to the admissibility of evidence of presumed intention in determining whether a term is to be implied in a contract. IMPLIED TERMS GENERALLY. 30. It is intended to consider the principles applicable to the implication of terms in a contract generally, and whether (and if so, when) a term of good faith is implied, and the extent to which it operates on TFC. It is not intended in this paper to address terms included in a contract by the operation of statute as, for example, in the sale of goods legislation, or s. 133 B (1) (a) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). 31. Categories of implied term were touched upon by Viscount Simonds in Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Limited where the distinction was made between terms that might be implied in a contract between two individuals assumed to be making a bargain in regard to a particular transaction or course of business on the one hand and terms arising from the status or relationship between he contracting parties generally. 32. Mason J in Codelfa described the distinction between the two types of implied term as an implied term necessary to give business efficacy to a particular contract on the one hand and, on the other, the implied term which is a legal incident of a particular class of contract, citing Liverpool City Council v Irwin as an example of the latter. 33. It may be sai d that Mason J in Codelfa supra. was describing what Lord Wilberforce recognized as two varieties of implied term. The first, where there is a complete bilateral contract. The Courts are sometimes willing to add terms as implied, where there is established usage, spelling out what the parties know and would, if asked, unhesitatingly agree to be a part of the bargain between them. The second, where the Courts are willing to add a term in an apparently complete bargain on the ground that without it the contract will not work. 34. Although Lord Denning endeavoured to make a third category (the implication of reasonable terms), the attempt failed. 35. Where a Court is concerned to establish what the contract is, the parties not having fully stated the terms, the Court searches for what must be implied. 6. A distinction was drawn between the two kinds of implied terms in Renard. For a term to be implied ad hoc in a contract, five conditions were to be satisfied: a. it must be reasonable and equitable; b. it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it; c. it must be so ob vious that â€Å"it goes without saying†; d. it must be capable of clear expression; e. it must not contradict any express term of the contract. 37. In referring to implication ad hoc Priestley JA in Renard was distinguishing between that category and a term implied by law. 8. The distinction is, for the time being, important when considering the implication of terms such as â€Å"good faith† as an incident to the kind of contract being considered. For example, building, construction or infrastructure contracts generally. 39. The implication of a term ad hoc occurs in circumstances of individual contracts. The implication of a term by law is based on imputed intention as opposed to actual intention, and implies a term as a legal incident of a particular class of contract. 40. Priestley JA in Renard supra. argues that contracts generally are subject to an implied term by law of good faith. 1. Handley and Meagher JJA. , although agreeing generally with the judgment of Pr iestley JA. arrived at their decisions without the necessity to imply a term by law as opposed to an ad hoc implication of a term. 42. In Australia, the law in relation to implied terms has authoritatively been considered in a number of cases. 43. In cases where the contract is not completely in written form, the automatic or rigid application of the cumulative criteria in BP in respect of implied terms ad hoc is to be approached with caution. 44. In Byrne supra. McHugh J and Gummow J in a joint judgment considered implied terms of â€Å"custom† and â€Å"business efficacy† as falling within the first category in paragraph 33 above and then excluded their ad hoc application in an employment contract because they were not so obvious that they would go without saying or that they were necessarily implied for the effective operation of the contract. 45. They then considered terms implied independent of intention and considered that even though such terms may be implied by law, they may be excluded by express provision made by the parties or by reason of inconsistency with the terms of the contract. 6. Further, in Byrne supra. the Court considered the concept of â€Å"necessity† and at 452. 9 considered the word as requiring the implication of a term only where, without it, the contract was rendered nugatory. It was observed at 450. 7 that the notion of â€Å"necessity† was crucial in modern cases in which courts have implied for the first time a new term as a matter of law. 47. In Australia, it has been suggested that there is an economic freedom which carries with it fundamental notions of caveat emptor. On that footing, although obiter, the implication of terms, for example, of good faith and fair dealing would be inconsistent with the law as it has developed in respect of the introduction of implied terms into written contracts which the parties have omitted to include. This view as it was expressed in the High Court has given rise to the debate now to be addressed. 48. Terms, including a term requiring good faith in the performance of a contract may be implied into a contract either ad hoc or by law. In the former the BP (Westernport) supra. nd the cases following upon it in respect of the implication of a term ad hoc must be addressed. In the latter, jurisprudence developed so far in Australia has not yet embraced the implication of a term of â€Å"good faith† in contracts generally or in particular classes of contract and the debate continues. IMPLIED TERM OF GOOD FAITH 49. â€Å"It is a general rule applicable to every contract that each party agrees, by implication, to do all such things as are necessary on his part to enable the other party to have the benefit of the contract†. 50. One might have thought that such a clear statement meant what it said. But it does not. 1. The implication in a contract of a term of good faith by law has not been considered definitively in the High Court.. Further the High Court has warned lower courts, including the New South Wales Court of Appeal (described as an intermediate appellate court), that they are to apply the law, not make it. Such comments make the determination of the ultimate issue all the more interesting. 52. But Sir Anthony Mason has opined that whether the acceptance of a duty of good faith in contract performance by the Courts will survive the High Court having regard to Royal Botanic Gardens supra, remains an unanswered question 53. The meaning of an implied term of good faith may be stated as broadly as â€Å"the obligation of good faith and reasonableness in the performance of a contractual obligation or in the exercise of a contractual power may be implied as a matter of law as a legal incident of a commercial contract†. 54. Further, it has been said that people generally including Judges and other lawyers have grown used to the Courts applying standards of fairness to contract which are wholly consistent with the existence in all contracts of a duty upon the parties of good faith and fair dealing in its performance. 55. An implied term of good faith has been recognized in other jurisdictions in Australia (although in Victoria there was a reluctance to conclude an implied term of good faith as a legal incident, so that an obligation of good faith applies indiscriminately to all rights and power conferred by a commercial contract). Further, in Pacific Brands supra. Finkelstein J said that the precise role of the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing in Australia, remains unclear. In Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty. Limited v Subaru (Aust. ) Pty. Limited at an interlocutory stage, an implied term of good faith and fair dealing was conceded. Finkelstein J said at [34], citing Renard, Hughes Aircraft and Alcatel supra. that in appropriate contracts, perhaps even in all commercial contracts, such a term would be implied as a legal incident of the relationship and not ad hoc. Whether there was an implied term by law was not necessary to decide, however. 56. Finkelstein J made the observation in Garry Rogers supra. that if a term was implied by law as opposed to an ad hoc implication, a contracting party would be required to act in good faith and fairly, not only in relation to the performance of a contractual obligation, but also in the exercise of a power conferred by the contract. 7. It seems to me that the distinction drawn by Finkelstein J. is perhaps illusory. If TFC permitted a contracting party to terminate it may may be described as the exercise of a power, as opposed to a contractual right. It further seems to me that the implication of a term of good faith ad hoc could carry with it the same obligations as a term implied by law. 58. In Western Australia a term was implied to act fairly in a process contract in respect of the defendant’s dealings with companies or groups invited to tender. In Dockpride the nature of the contract pursuant to which a number of tenders would be received, required overriding terms to be implied in respect of all tenders rather than individual tenders. The decision suggests that the term was implied by law and not ad hoc in respect of the contract generally. In considering the content of such a term His Honour said that â€Å"good faith† meant at least that the Authority was precluded from acting subjectively in bad faith and must treat all tenderers fairly. It may be argued that an ad hoc implication of a term to act in good faith would have been sufficient in the circumstances. 59. Also, in Western Australia the exercise of a contractual power (to make additions and deletions to products and customers on reasonable notice) was subject to an implied term of good faith. In Topseal, His Honour, was considering whether an implied term of good faith applied to individual clauses and not to the contract as a whole. His Honour was considering an implied term ad hoc. 60. In Thiess Contractors Pty. Limited v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty. Limited, Templeman J. considered the implication of a term of good faith in respect of a provision giving Placer â€Å"at its option, at any time and for any reason it may deem advisable, cancel and terminate the contract, in which event the Contractor shall be entitled to receive compensation†¦Ã¢â‚¬  It was held that the absolute power in the provision displaced any requirement to exercise it in good faith. The term was clear and unambiguous and was construed in the ontext in which it appeared. As later discussed, it would appear that in the face of specifically expressed provisions requiring good faith in respect of some of the provisions of the contract in Theiss a term requiring good faith was submitted to be implied by law to a TFC in the contract. The case is in many respects unsatisfactory. 61. The reasons of Warren CJ in Esso supra. were followed by a paper delivered by Her Honour in 2009 which recognized the difficulty in applying an implied term of good faith. Her Honour’s view was clearly favourable to the implication of terms requiring good faith by law in commercial contracts, relying extensively on authority for holding that view. 62. Eighteen indicia of â€Å"good faith† have been identified in the context of negotiation, in the field of industrial law. They are interesting but do not inform the debate. 63. Whether terms (including good faith and fair dealing) may be implied and, if so whether they are implied by law as an incident of the type of contract, or, ad hoc to particular contracts or provisions in particular contracts, seems to me important in at least one respect. On the one hand, it may be argued that the content of a term implied by law may be the same as the content of a term implied ad hoc. On the other hand, the requirements for the implication of a term ad hoc are often difficult to establish as many of the cases suggest. The implication of a term by law to commercial contracts generally or to particular kinds of commercial contracts would meet what might otherwise be a difficult task. 64. To an extent considerations relevant to the implication of terms ad hoc elide with relevant considerations when considering terms being implied by law. That is unsatisfactory and confusing. There is to say the least a degree of overlap leading McHugh and Gummow JJ to observe that terms implied by law to particular classes of contract had their origins as implications based on the intention of the parties, but thereafter became so much a part of the common understanding as to be imported into all transactions of the particular description. 65. Further, it seems to me that the cases do not suggest that the implication of a term by law to particular kinds of provisions in contracts generally, or commercial contracts in particular, is an inappropriate extension of the jurisprudence on this topic in Australia. Indeed Theiss supra. at first instance may be considered as a case where it was argued that an implied term of good faith applied by law to a termination clause rather than to the whole contract. 66. Having made those observations, however, and proceeding therefore on the basis of â€Å"if there is a duty of good faith† and not here dealing with the question whether good faith in a contract is implied or arises from the construction of the contract, the definition of the content of an implied term of good faith is somewhat fluid. Sir Anthony Mason has said that there are three aspects to good faith: a. An obligation on the parties to cooperate in achieving the contractual objects (loyalty to the promise itself); b. Compliance with honest standards of conduct; c. Compliance with standards of conduct which are reasonable having regard to the interests of the parties. 67. An obligation of good faith in a relevant context of termination for convenience clauses in contracts may therefore include (each of the following is capable of its own implication without relying on the umbrella of â€Å"good faith)†: d. Honesty – Sir Anthony Mason’s second point; e. Reasonable conduct – contracts will be construed reasonably, considering the position of the parties; f. Reasonableness in the exercise of discretions. That is to say a discretion cannot be exercised unreasonably in an administrative law sense; g. Unconscionability; h. Cooperation. 68. Implying an obligation of good faith may carry with it concepts of reasonableness and discretion. The standards by which a relevant state of satisfaction is reached may lead to a consideration of Administrative Law concepts, particularly where one or some of the parties are government authorities. For example, a termination for convenience provision allowing a party in its discretion to terminate the contract at its will, requires a decision to be made which may involve the exercise of a discretion or the formulation of a judgment in the exercise of the power. Abu Dhabi supra. is one example of it. 69. An implied duty to act in good faith and fairly has been expressed in a positive and a negative sense. That is to say, it will require a contracting party to act in good faith and fairly, not only in relation to the performance of a contractual obligation, but also in the xercise of a power conferred by the contract. The obligation of good faith and fair dealing would act as a restriction on a power to terminate a contract, especially if that power was in general terms. Further, the implied term restricts the party from acting capriciously. It would not operate to restrict actions designed to promote the legitimate interests of a party. Providing the party exercising the power a cts reasonably in all the circumstances, the duty to act fairly and and in good faith will ordinarily be satisfied. 0. Against the above backround, which may suggest a tide of support in Australia for terms to be implied by law in a commercial contract, a number of authorities have decided against such an implication in their own fact situations. None of them has decided against implication by law in principle in appropriate circumstances. It is an open question. 71. Of significant importance in this context, is Gummow J’s decision in the Federal Court in Service Station Association Limited v Berg Bennett Associates Pty. Limited. His Honour’s reasoning at [25]-[40] (to p. 407) was not inconsistent with the Court’s (Gleeson CJ. , Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. ) reasoning in Royal Botanic Gardens supra. [69]-[71], [86]-[87]. It might therefore be thought that Gommow J’s apparently consistent view that the implication of a term (of good faith) by operation of law would be a major step would be influential at least if a â€Å"good faith implied by law† case was before it. 72. Further, the recognition that in many Australian jurisdictions statutory regimes are in place to ameliorate cases of hardship in individual cases caused by the strict application of legal principle to contractual relations provides good reason to adhere to principle in cases where such legislation does not apply or is not invoked. 73. The decision in Thiess supra. , on one view, is consistent with the observations in the High Court in Royal Botanic Gardens supra. , and Gummow J. in Service Station Association supra. , but inconsistent with the development of the implied term of good faith by law in courts other than the High Court. In Theiss, however, good faith was an express requirement of the contract, but found not to apply to the termination clause, otherwise expressed clearly. The question in Theiss, therefore, was whether there should be implied by law a term of good faith to the termination for convenience provision in the contract, as opposed to the contract as a whole. His Honour’s reference to Gummow J’s decision in Service Station (and by not referring directly to authority in respect of the implication of terms ad hoc) would indicate that was the approach. As a question of construction a term was not implied. The TFC was specific and unambiguous. 4. In the circumstances of the particular contract (although it appears that expressio unius was not argued), Theiss should be distinguished from other authorities in Courts, other than the High Court, which appear to be developing a body of jurisprudence favouring the implication of a term requiring good faith in the performance of and the e xercise of powers in commercial contracts as a matter of law. 75. The decisions cited in this paper would suggest that jurisprudence is developing with a â€Å"playing it safe† approach in the sense used by Warren CJ in Esso supra. [2], that is â€Å"if there is a duty of good faith†¦Ã¢â‚¬ . Decisions implying terms by law as opposed to the ad hoc implication of terms are persuasive but not binding, and principle is still developing. By contrast, decisions implying terms ad hoc are determined by the application of binding principle to the facts of individual cases. 76. There is good reason to conclude that, at least until the High Court addresses the issue, a term of good faith in the performance of and the exercise of powers in commercial contracts will be implied, as a matter of law and ad hoc, in appropriate circumstances, including building, construction and infrastructure contracts. Even in the face of clearly expressed and unambiguous terms a termination for convenience provision in a contract will be, it is here argued, subject to the implication of a term requiring good faith either ad hoc or by law. The more so would a term requiring good faith be implied on one basis or the other in circumstances where parties may contract out and agree that terms implied either by law or ad hoc will not apply. INVOKING A TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE PROVISION. 77. The purpose of TFC is to enable a party to discharge a contract and bring it to an end in circumstances where there remain executory obligations. 8. The terms of the TFC must be complied with. If conditions precedent to the effective termination of a contract are present, strict compliance with them is required. 79. If not contracted out, an implied term of good faith (that is, implied either by law or implied ad hoc) will apply to the provision, based on the arguments presented in this paper. 80. Provided the pro visions of the TFC are complied with the contract is discharged and is at an end. The consequences of a valid termination will be addressed shortly. 81. If a contract has been purportedly terminated for invalid or ineffective reasons, it is arguable that TFC can be resorted to to terminate the contract for valid reasons under that clause provided its terms and the obligation of good faith are complied with. That could only occur if the contract was still on foot, that is, for example, absent the breach of a fundamental term or repudiation. 82. TFC may be breached by invoking the provision other than in good faith. What is relevant here is the breach of substantive terms of the contract, that is, the TFC 83. A TFC provision may be breached by actions contrary to its terms, It may also be breached because it is â€Å"tied† to an obligation of good faith which was absent when it was acted on. 84. It has been argued that â€Å"It is not possible for a breach of an obligation of good faith to lead to an award of damages. A breach attracting compensation would need to be a breach of a substantive term. † 85. Peden has suggested that there has been no award of damages for breach of an independent obligation of good faith in Australia. It has always been â€Å"tied† to a breach of a substantive provision. The position may be different in the United States. 6. In my view Peden is probably correct. An implied term could not be so extensive as to allow the provision to â€Å"stand alone† and be, in that sense, independent of the contract, or the provisions of the contract’ which attracts it. Prudently, however, a pleading would properly allege a breach of an impl ied term as well. 87. Significantly whether a breach of an implied term is alleged or, whether a breach of a substantive term, for want of good faith is alleged, subjective elements become relevant a consideration of the criteria in paragraphs 65-66 are sufficient to demonstrate the point here being made. . THE VALID TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT PURSUANT TO TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE PROVISIONS 88. Termination in these circumstances is termination without breach. That is to say, the contract is discharged independent of fault. 89. In that sense TFC provisions constitute an agreement to terminate a contract, which has executory obligations. Therefore, consideration independent of the consideration in the contract of which it is a part may be required and, prudently, should be given. 90. Discharge of a contract without fault may occur under the doctrine of frustration. It may also occur by express agreement as in TFC. 91. The consequences of discharge where there is no fault depends on the intention of the parties, express or implied. But in the absence of clearly expressed terms, there is an inference that the termination operates as to the future only, that is, so far as it is executory, and does not discharge such accrued liabilities and accrued rights as arose from performance or breach. 92. In Financings Limited v Baldock the Court was dealing with contractual provisions defining a number of events any one of which gave an option to bring the contract to an end. The contract was effectively silent about the consequences of terminating the contract. The owners, in that instance, were forced to rely on ordinary remedies for breaches accrued at the date of termination. 93. It would be, to say the least, imprudent not to make provision in termination for convenience provisions for damages or compensation on termination, but not for the reasons stated by Lloyd J in Abbey. He reasoned, inadequately it is submitted, that if adequate compensation was not provided for upon termination for convenience, the parties ran the risk of the provision being â€Å"treated as leonine and unenforceable as unconscionable†. That is not a correct statement of the law, at least in Australia. It would be difficult to find a fact situation where any party to a contract of the kind containing termination for convenience provisions was under any kind of â€Å"special disability† in dealing with the other party to the transaction to satisfy one of the elements of unconscionability. 94. If a TFC fails to provide for compensation there are, it is suggested, adequate remedies at law. The absence of compensation provisions is not a sound reason for not enforcing TFC otherwise expressed clearly and unambiguously, subject to the implied term of good faith. CONCLUSIONS 95. The reasoning of McHugh and Gummow JJ in Byrne supra. (although at 452-453 their Honours found no â€Å"necessity† in the sense required to imply a term in a contract of employment), was not inconsistent with the development of a principle of an implied term of good faith by law in commercial contracts generally. 96. It is submitted that a term requiring good faith in the performance of a commercial contract will be implied by law in Australia and will apply to TFC. 97. It is submitted that as long as the issue develops below the High Court, there will be an inclination to imply a term of good faith, either ad hoc to particular contracts or particular provisions of contracts (for example TFC) or as a matter of law to the class of contract. 98. TFC provisions are valid and enforceable, but will be subject to an implied term of good faith unless contracted out by specific provisions in the contract or by necessary implication. [ 1 ]. Some examples of â€Å"termination for convenience† provisions are in fn. 9. [ 2 ]. Carter on Contract, LexisNexis [33-080]. [ 3 ]. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Limited v Selfridge Co. Limited [1915] AC 847 at 855; Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95 at 105; Carter ibid. [01-001] [ 4 ]. For example, in the â€Å"ticket† case MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Comm. Of State Taxation (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 133 per Barwick CJ. [ 5 ]. Australian Woolle Mills Pty. Limited v The Co mmonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424 at 457; Ermogenous ibid. 105. [ 6 ]. South Australia v The Commonwealth (1962) 108 CLR 130 at 154 per Windeyer J. [ 7 ]. Wallace-Smith v Thiess Infraco (Swanston) Pty. Limited [2005] FCAFC 49 (30 March 2005) [60]. [ 8 ]. GEC Marconi Systems Pty. Limited v BHP Information Technology Pty. Limited [2003] FCA 50 (12 February, 2003) per Finn J. [738] seqq.. [ 9 ]. Government Contracts, Seddon, 3rd. Ed at 194 [5. 2] [ 10 ]. Agreements about the Exercise of Statutory Powers, Prof. Enid Campbell, 45 ALJ 338 at339-340. [ 11 ]. Ibid. 338; J. D. B. Mitchell â€Å"The Contracts of Public Authorities (1954) p. 56. [ 12 ]. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd. V The Commonwealth (1977) 129 CLR 54 at 74 per Mason J. 13 ]. Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v The King [1921] 3KB 500. [ 14 ]. Ibid. 503. 7. [ 15 ]. The Doctrine of Executive Necessity in the Law of Contract, P. W. Hohh, 44 ALJ 154 and Enid Campbell ibid. 340. [ 16 ]. Ansett Transport Industries ibid. at 78 per Mason J. ; see also L’Huillier ibid. at 477-478 per Callaway JA. [ 17 ]. Seddon, ibid. 194. [ 18 ]. The Amphitrite ibid. 503 and s ee L’Huillier v State of Victoria [1996] 2 VLR 465 at 478 per Callaway JA. [ 19 ]. Ansett ibid.. 74. [ 20 ]. See, for example, Northern Territory v Skywest Pty. Limited (1987) 48 NTR 20 at 47; Allars, M. Administrative Law, Government Contracts and the Level Playing Field† (1989) UNSWLJ 114 at 123; Seddon ibid. 196; Administrative Law, Wade Forsyth 7th. Ed. 843-845. [ 21 ]. Enid Campbell ibid. 340; and see Ansett Transport Industries ibid. at 76-77 per Mason J. who seems to reason, consistently with Hogg ibid. 159, that damages follow. [ 22 ]. Ansett Transport Industries ibid. at 74 per Mason J. [ 23 ]. Ibid. 159. [ 24 ]. Legislative Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia, Wynes, 5th Ed. 387 seqq. ; Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Aronson Dyer 2nd Ed. 26-133. [ 25 ]. Enid Campbell ibid. 340 [ 26 ]. Seddon ibid. 197 [5. 4]; and see AGS Commercial Notes Number 27 (3 June 2008), Scala, Lang and Browitt. [ 27 ]. Ansett ibid. 74 [ 28 ]. See para. 11 fn. 21. [ 29 ]. But see 45 (c) below where administrative law concepts for the exercise of a discretion seem to be developing in the law of contract. [ 30 ]. Australian National University v Burns (1982) 64 FLR 166 at 174 per Bowen CJ and Lockhart J. ; General Newspapers Pty. Limited v Telstra Corpn. (1993) 45 FCR 164 (FCFC); Panel on Take-overs and Mergers; ex parte Datafin Plc. 1987] 1 QB 815; Administrative Law, Wade Forsyth ibid. ; Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Aronson Dyer Groves 4th. Ed [3. 220]-[3. 330];[3. 270]-[3. 280];[12. 75]; [ 31 ]. Kellogg Brown Root Pty. Limited v Australian Aerospace Limited [2007] VSC 200 (15 June 2007) per Hansen J. [54]. [ 32 ]. Anderson Formrite Pty. Limited v Baulderstone Pty. Limited (No. 7) [2010] FCA 921 (25 August, 2010 per GrahamJ [104]. Reasons for separate consideration although not given but were likely for an agreement to discharge a contract: D C Builders Limited v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617 at 626 A-C per Danckwerts LJ. and Foakes v Be er 9 AC 605 at 613. [ 33 ]. GEC Marconi Systems ibid. , ref. in Kellogg Brown Root Pty. Limited v Australian Aerospace Limited [2007] VSC 200 (15 June, 2007) [53] per Hansen J. [ 34 ]. Some examples are found in Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty. Limited v Subaru (Aust) Pty. Limited [1999] FCA 903 (2 July 1999) per Finkelstein J [1];Anderson Formrite ibid. [103]; GEC Marconi ibid. [739]; Kellogg Root ibid. [10]; Theiss Contractors Pty. Limited v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty. Limited [1999] WASC 1046 (16 April, 1999); AGS â€Å"Commercial Notes† No. 27 (3 June, 2008) ibid. Rail Link and infrastructure contract for the South West Rail Link Sydney, obtained on application to the principals. [ 35 ]. Krygoski Construction Co. Inc. v The United States [1996] USCAFED 1133; 94 F 3d 1537 [17] – [26]; GEC Marconi ibid. [748]; 64 American Jurisprudence 2d, Public Works and Contracts, [165]. [ 36 ]. Krygoski ibid. [19]. [ 37 ]. 64 American Jurisprudence ibid. [165]; GEC Marconi ibid. [ 745]. [ 38 ]. Shepherd v Felt and Textiles Australia Limited [1931] HCA 21; (1931) 45 CLR 359 at 377 per Dixon J. ; Rawson v Hobbs [1961] HCA 72; (1961) 107 CLR 466 at 489 per Kitto J. GEC Marconi ibid. [747]. [ 39 ]. Codelfa Construction Pty. Limited v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1981-82) 149 CLR 337 at 350 seqq. And 353. 3, 357. 1, per Mason J. ; 373. 8 per Aickin J. ; 401-402 per Brennan J. [ 40 ]. [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912F- 913E. ; the principles were clarified by Lord Hoffman in Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251 [39],[62]; LMI Australasia Pty. Limited v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty. Limited [2003] NSWCA 74 (10 April 2003) [32] per Young CJ in Eq. [ 41 ]. Maggbury Pty. Limited v Hafele Aust. Pty. Limited (2001) 76 ALJR 246 at 248 [11] per Gleeson CJ Gummow and Hayne JJ. ; Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 76 ALJR 436 at 445 [39] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,,McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. [ 42 ]. Ibid. [ 43 ]. Garcia v National Australia Bank Limited (1998) 194 CLR 395 at 403 [17}. [ 44 ]. L. Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Limited [1974] AC 235 at 251; cited with approval in this context in Shevill v Builders Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620 per Gibbs CJ at [7]. [ 45 ]. Contract Law in Australia, Carter, Peden, Tolthurst, 5th ed. 12-04]; Charter Reinsurance Co. Limited v Fagan [1997] AC 313 at 388; Peppers Hotel Management Pty. Limited v Hotel Capital Partners Limited [2004] NSWCA 114 [69] per McColl JA. [ 46 ]. McCann v Switzerland Insurance Australia Limited Ors. (2000) 203 CLR 579 at 589 [22] per Gleeson CJ. [ 47 ]. MGICA Limited v United City Merchants (Australia) Limited (1986) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-729 at 4,351. [ 48 ]. In vestors ibid 114-115. [ 49 ]. McCann ibid. [22] per Gleeson CJ, [74] per Kirby J. [ 50 ]. Metrolands Investments Limited v J. H. Dewhurst Limited [1986] 3 AER 659 at 668. [ 51 ]. Goss v Lord Nugent (1833) 110 AER 713 at 716; Codelfa ibid. 347. 7 per Mason J. [ 52 ]. Codelfa ibid. 352. 2 per Mason J. [ 53 ]. Codelfa ibid. 352. 4. [ 54 ]. Codelfa ibid. 352. 7 per Mason J. [ 55 ]. Heimann v The Commonwealth (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 691; Codelfa ibid. 652. 9-653. 3. [ 56 ]. Codelfa ibid. 353. 3-. 8 per Mason J. [ 57 ]. [1957] AC555 at 576 [ 58 ]. Ibid. 345. 8. [ 59 ]. [1976] 2 AER 39 – an easement or licence to use stairs and lifts to a leased upper level dwelling. [ 60 ]. Liverpool City Council v Irwin anor. [1976] 2 AER 39 at 43 (b) – (g)_ per Lord Wilberforce; cited with approval in Codelfa ibid. 45. 7 per Mason J. ; 402. 7-403 per Brennan J [ 61 ]. Liverpool CC ibid. 43 (d). [ 62 ]. Liverpool CC ibid. 43 (d)-(e). [ 63 ]. Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1975] 3 AER 658 at 664. [ 64 ]. Liverpool CC ibid. (HL) see fn. 51, at 43 (f). [ 65 ]. Liverpool CC ibid (HL) 43 (f)-(g). [ 66 ]. In Renard Constructions (ME) Pty. Limited v Minister for Public Works, (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 at 256 A-B per Priestley JA. -referred to as â€Å"implication ad hoc†. [ 67 ]. Byrne v Australian Airlines Limited (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 442. 1 per McHugh J and Gummow J. [ 68 ]. B. P. Refinery (Westernport) Pty. Limited v Hastings Shire Council (1978) 52 ALJR 20 at 26 (PC); Concrete Pty. Limited v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty. Limited [2006] HCA 55 [152] (an example of the 5th. Condition) [ 69 ]. Renard ibid. 256 C-E; Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v Carlton United Breweries Limited (1987) 10 NSWLR 468 at 486-490. [ 70 ]. Renard ibid. 256 D-E. [ 71 ]. ibid. 265, 268 E-G. [ 72 ]. Ibid. 279 B-C per Handley JA; 275 E-F per Meagher JA. [ 73 ]. For example, Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corpn. (1984) 156 CLR 41; [1984] HCA 64 [22-[26] per Gibbs CJ. ; Mason J. 55], [64]-[65]; Wilson J. [ 4]-[5]; Deane J. [4], [49]-[50]. [ 74 ]. Byrne ibid. 422; 442. 5; Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 573 per Deane J. [ 75 ]. Byrne ibid. 446. [ 76 ]. Byrne ibid. 447-449. [ 77 ]. Byrne ibid. 449. 9 [ 78 ]. Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney Council [2002] HCA 5 [86]-[87] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. [ 79 ]. Butt v M’Donald (1896) 7 QLJ 68 at 70-71; Real Estate (Australia) Limited v St. Martins Investments Pty. Limited [1979] HCA 51[26] per Mason J. ; (1979) 53 ALJR 745 at 749; Hospital Products ibid. 45]-[47] per Dawson J. [ 80 ]. But see Concut Pty. Limited v Worrell [2000] HCA 64 [57] per Kirby J. re an employment contract. [ 81 ]. Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts, Elisabeth Peden 2003. [ 82 ]. Alcatel Australia Limited v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 at 369; Burger King Corporation v Hyngry Jack’s Pty. Limited (2001) NSWCA 187 [159], [164];Vodafone Pacific Limited v Mobile Innovations Limited [2004] NSWCA 15 (20 February 2004) [125] per Giles JA. [ 83 ]. Renard ibid. 268 F-G per Priestley JA. [ 84 ]. Esso Australia Resources Pty. Limited v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228 (15 September 2005) [25], [28] per Buchanan JA; hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1 [37] per Finn J. Pacific Brands Sport Leisure Pty. Limited v Underworks Pty. Limited [2005] FCA 288 [61]-[65] per Finkelstein J.. [ 85 ]. [1999] FCA 903 (2 July 1999] per Finkelstein J [34]-[35]. [ 86 ]. Castlemaine Tooheys Limited c Carlton United Breweries Limited (1987) 10 NSWLR 468 at 487 per Hope J; Byrne ibid. , 185 CLR 410 at 449 per McHugh and Gummow JJ. [ 87 ]. Dockpride Pty. Limited anor. V Subiaco Redevelopment Authority [2005] WASC 211 (22 September, 2005) [151]-[156] per LeMiere J. [ 88 ]. Ibid. [158]; Chinook Aggregates Limited v Abbotsford (Municipal District) (1989) 40 BCLR (2D) 345. [ 89 ]. Topseal Concrete Services Pty. Limited v Sika Australia Pty. Limited [2008] WASC 57 (10 April, 2008) per Beech J. [53]-[[69]. [ 90 ]. [1999] WASC 1046 (16 April 1999) appealed in [2000] WASCA 102 (14 April 2000) but not relevantly overturned. [ 91 ]. â€Å"Developments in Contract†, 15 October, 2009 delivered to the Judicial College of Victoria. [ 92 ]. Western Australia v Taylor (1996) 134 FLR 211 ref. n Brownley v Western Australia [1999] FCA 1139 [20]. [ 93 ]. BP (Westernport) ibid. [ 94 ]. Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; Byrne ibid. (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 449. [ 95 ]. Breen ibid 449. [ 96 ]. Esso ibid. [2] per Warren CJ. [ 97 ]. Peden ibid. 92; [ 98 ]. Peden ibid [7. 2]. [ 99 ]. Contract and its Relationship with Equitable Standards and the Doctrine of Good Fai th, The Cambridge Lectures, 1993 (8 July, 1993. [ 100 ]. Abu Dhabi National Tanker Co. v Product Star Shipping Limited (No. 2). [1993] Lloyd’s Rep. 397 at 404 per LegattLJ. [ 101 ]. Alcatel Australia ibid 349 at 369. [ 102 ]. Expectation Pty. Limited v Pinnacle VRB Limited [2002] WASCA 160 (19 June, 2002) [89]-[90]. [ 103 ]. See also, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Aronson, Dyer 2nd. ed. 126; Re Tracey [2011] NSWCA 43 (1 February 2011) [26]-[42]. [ 104 ]. Garry Rogers ibid. per Finkelstein J [34]-[39]. Dockpride ibid. [158]; Renard ibid. 234, 263; Esso ibid. [3]. [ 105 ]. For example, GSA Group Pty. Limited v Siebe PLC (1993) 30 NSWLR 573 at 581 E-F per Rogers CJ Comm. D. [ 106 ]. 117 ALR 393. [ 107 ]. Service Station ibid. 407. [ 108 ]. Warren CJ â€Å"Good Faith: Where are We At? † ibid. ; Service Station ibid. at 407 [10]; Toll (FGCT) Pty. Limited v Alphapharm Pty. Limited [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at 183 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon JJ. [ 109 ]. Warren CJ â€Å"Good Faith – Where Are We At? † ibid. [ 110 ]. Byrne ibid. 449. 9. [ 111 ]. Mardorf Peach Co. Pty. Limited v Attica Sea Carriers Corp. of Liberia [1977] AC 850 at 870 per Lord Wilberforce; Mannai Investment Co. Limited v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co. Limited [1977] AC 749 per Lord Hoffmann. [ 112 ]. Para. 15 above and fn 38. [ 113 ]. Peden ibid. [8. 2]. [ 114 ]. Ibid. [8. 4]. [ 115 ]. Ibid. [8. 3]. [ 116 ]. See para. 12 and fn. 32; D. C. Builders ibid 626 A-C. 117 ]. Carter on Contract ibid. [31-020]. [ 118 ]. Segur v Frankklin (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 67 at 72; McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Limited (1933) 48 CLR 457 at 477 per Dixon J. [ 119 ]. [1963] 2 QB 104 at 121 per Diplock LJ. [ 120 ]. Ibid. 121. 5 [ 121 ]. Abbey Developments Limited v PP Brickworks Limited [2003] EWHC (Technology) 1987 per Lloyd J. [ 122 ]. Lopwell Pty . Limited v Clarke [2009] NSWCA 165 (14 August 2009) per Macfarlan JA (Ipp and Campbell JJA agreeing); ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty. Limited [2003] HCA 18; (2003) 214 CLR 51; Blomley v Ryan [1956] HCA 81; (1956) 99 CLR 362 per Kitto J.

Friday, March 6, 2020

The Effect of Divorce on Sons Aggression essays

The Effect of Divorce on Sons Aggression essays The Effect of Divorce on Sons ¡ Aggression The divorce rate has dramatically and progressively increased in recent years (Bridgeman Lowen Clinical theorists have presented a convincing rationale for these findings. Pieri (1985) has pointed out that the breakdown of the nuclear family and, as is typical, the departure of the father from the family, leads to anger stemming from the change in family status, disruption of secure routines, blame casting, depression, and economic stresses. Boys, who are apt to be more closely identified with the father, are more likely to display anger in the form of aggressive acting-out behavior (Wright, 1984). It is important that these clinical observations and theoretical formulations are subjected to more rigorous scientific assessment. The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that boys of divorced parents are prone to anger, thereby providing research support for existing theoretical formulations. This investigation aims to offer experimental confirmation of the idea that anger is a distinguishing characteristic of boys of divorced p...

Wednesday, February 19, 2020

Introduction, Review of Accounting Process and Financial Statements Essay

Introduction, Review of Accounting Process and Financial Statements case assignment 1 - Essay Example Double Entry system of accounting is a standard used to record all the transactions at least in two accounts. This results in the one or more accounts being debited as well as credited. This system of accounting is very effective as it permits more accuracy in checking and also permits more balanced accounts. This is mainly because all the accounts with a debit balance need to equal the credit balance of the accounts as well (Burke & Litwin). The original monetary value of a good is referred to as the historical cost. This has been criticized for a number of inaccuracies. Historical costing does not take into account the gains or losses unless they have been realised. However use of historical costing is very helpful and provides the management with a better view of the fair value of the item or also the market value. This helps the management make more informed decisions and make more educated strategies as well. Although historical costs have been very helpful for the management, there are a number of criticisms that relate to the same as well. It has been noted that historical costs only considers the cost allocations and does not consider the value of the assets. Accrual basis accounting is one where all the transactions, i.e. the incomes and expenses are recorded when the transactions occur. On the other hand, cash basis accounting refers to the transactions that are recorded when the income or expenditure is received or paid. There is no focus on the date of the transaction. However the accrual basis is one of the most popular systems of accounting and is followed by most companies and is also required to be followed by law. The accrual basis of accounting provides a clear picture of the financial state of the business. Current assets and liabilities refer to the short terms assets and liabilities, i.e. those that need to be settled within one year. On the other hand, a non current asset or